The main contribution of this paper is to analyze a secure password authentication mechanism (SPAM), proposed by Chuang et al. in 2013 (IEEE Syst J.). The SPAM was used for designing a secure handover in Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) networks. Chuang et al. in the original paper claimed that SPAM provides high security properties and can resist various attacks. However, in this paper we point out that SPAM is vulnerable to the critical attacks, such as stolen smart card and off-line dictionary attack, replay attack and impersonation attack. In addition, we show that the identity of mobile nodes (MNs) and the session key between MNs and mobile access gateway (MAG) can be disclosed by an insider attacker; resultantly, anonymity and confidentiality between MNs and MAG will be completely broken in SPAM. In-order to counter these problems, an improved scheme is offered which also reduces the computational cost. Moreover, the scheme delivers the anonymity/ untraceability and secure session key agreement. Finally, the security of the scheme is proved in the random oracle model.
Introduction
Wireless and mobile communication connectivity systems have recently been increasingly developed. A human-like who carry small mobile devices is able to access real-time and multimedia services, such as the Internet services, VoIP, video conferencing, and multimedia applications in much more convenient and pleasurable ways. Hence, the wireless connectivity performance is affected with the emergence of such services especially when the tendency of Mobile Node's (MN) mobility is extraordinary. The issue becomes critical when MN roams across the networks. Therefore, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) developed Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [10] along with its optimized enhancement Fast MIPv6 (FMIPv6) [15] , and Hierarchical MIPv6 (HMIPv6) [23] in order to enable an MN to maintain continuous communication service. Additionally, a hostbased mobility approach is maintained by these protocols [5, 8, 9] . However, all of these suffer by numerous weaknesses, which include: signaling overhead, data loss, high power requirements, latency during handover and extensive mobility signaling functionality [1] .
To counter the performance challenges of such protocols, Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) protocol [6] has been recently standardized by the Network-based Localized Mobility Management (NETLMM) Working-Group of the IETF as a network-based mobility management protocol.
The PMPIPv6 involves three (3) type of entities including: (i) a mobile-access gateway (MAG), (ii) a local mobility-anchor (LMA), and (iii) an authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) server.
Although, the PMIPv6 is having better performance than MIPv6 during handover, still its latency is high than desired. Furthermore, PMIPv6 struggles against inefficient authentication, packet loss throughout the handover process [14, 18, 25] and the vulnerability to numerous threats [11] .
To improve and extend PMIPv6, several research results have been proposed in recent years. Lee et al. [19] proposed an improvement for PMIPv6 to: (i) enhance the scalability and (ii) reduce signaling cost during mobility. The competent global mobility amid at PMIPv6 was introduced by Lee et al. [20] . The triangle-routing problem of PMIPv6 is astounded by Liebsch et al. [21] and Dutta et al. [4] . In IETF [26, 27, 7] also designed some handover schemes to reduce packet loss and seamless finishing. Until now, secure handover for PMIPv6 has got a very minute attention. Lee and Chung [16] proposed two secure handover schemes: (i) handover re-authentication (HORA) and (ii) handover early-authentication (HOEA). Recently, Chuang et al. [3] also proposed a secure handover for PMIPv6 using a secure password authentication mechanism (SPAM). However, these secure handover for PMIPv6 have not been analyzed for security attributes in the literature. Accordingly, the main contribution of this paper is to analyze the existing security mechanisms for handover in PMIPv6. For this reason, we briefly review Chuang et al.'s security handover for PMIPv6 and demonstrate that it does not satisfy the expected security attributes for a secure handover in PMIPv6. We then show that it is vulnerable to the critical attacks such as: (i) stolen smartcard, (ii) off-line dictionary, (iii) replay and (iv) impersonation attacks. In addition, we point out that the identity of MNs and the session key between MN and MAG can be disclosed by an insider attacker in Chuang et al.'s mechanism; resultantly, anonymity and confidentiality between MNs and MAG will be completely broken. Therefore, in spite of the claims of Chuang et al., we show that their mechanism is not suitable for achieving secure handover in PMIPv6.
The remaining parts of the paper are as follows: Section II describes the network architecture of PMIPv6. Section III reviews of Chuang et al.'s security handover for PMIPv6 in detail. In Section IV, we analyze Chuang et al.'s mechanism and demonstrate the security weaknesses of it. Section V describes the proposed improved scheme. The security analysis and comparisons are discussed in Section VI and Section VII, respectively. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section VIII.
Proxy Mobile IPv6 Protocol Overview
PMIPv6 protocol provides a framework for IP mobility provision to a MN, while hiding the related signaling from MN. The involved entities within the framework track MN's mobility and builds the route state.
The LMA, MAG and AAA server are the main entities in PMIPV6 framework. The LMA is the anchor-point for MN's home network prefix(es) and maintains MN's reachability state. The MAG incorporates the link where MN is anchored and executes MN's mobility management. The MAG is liable for MN's registration with corresponding LMA. A PMIPv6 domain is having various LMAs to serve several grouping of MNs. The MN's authentication is the responsibility of AAA server, which is performed when an MN comes in some PMIPv6 domain, the MAG identifies the MN, extracts its identity and conveys it to AAA server in the domain. A scenario of PMIPv6 domain is solicited in Figure 1 .
The mobility signaling flow of PMIPv6 encompasses two situations: (i) initial attachment and (ii) handover situations. The initial attachment commences when a MN attaches to the PMIPv6 domain until it becomes able to process the data transmission [6] . The latter situation is occurred when the MN travels from the current MAG (MAG1) to a new MAG (MAG2) in the localized mobility domain (LMD), as shown in Fig.  2 
A. Initial registration phase
For registration, following steps are performed among an MN and AAA server using a secure channel:
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C. Password Change phase
The password change phase is committed by MN without any intervention of AAA or MAG. The detailed steps of this phase are as follows:
Step 1. The user inserts his smartcard into a reader and feeds his MN ID and
Step 2. The smartcard computes and verifies whet- 
Security weaknesses of Chuang et al.'s scheme
Chuang et al. claimed that their scheme can resist many types of attacks and satisfy all the essential requirements for password-based authentications. However, we show that Chuang et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the stolen smartcard and off-line dictionary attack, the user's identity and the session key disclosure, replay attack and the MAG impersonation attack. Now, we will elaborate the assumptions regarding the security of the smartcard and power of the adversary as follows [2, 24] :
A. Stolen smartcard and off-line dictionary attack
In the literature, many papers assumed that the smartcards are equipped with tamper resistant hardware. However, this is not the case. Since all the sensitive information stored in the memory of a smartcard can be extracted by monitoring the power consumption of the smartcard as explained in the papers [13, 22] . Therefore, we assume that all the sensitive information stored in the memory of a smartcard are known for its owner or an attacker who found or stolen it. Therefore, if the smartcard of a user MN is stolen, can extract the information The details are as follows.
B. Disclosure of MNs' identities
In this subsection, we show that the adversary who knows 3 ( || ) The proposed scheme
The vulnerabilities of Chaung et al.'s scheme were due to the design of the initial registration phase and the authentication between the MN and the MAG. Hence, in this section, we redesign these two phases to evade the flaws. The outline of the proposed improved scheme is also shown in Figure 3 .
A. Initial registration phase
The detail of registration is as follows: 4 , h()} in a smartcard and sends it to MN using some secure channel. 4 Upon reception of the smartcard, MN inserts c 0 in it.
B. MN-MAG Authentication
Step 1. The user inserts his/her smartcard into a card reader and inputs ID MN and PW MN . The MN using c 0 computes Step 6. The MN sends Step 7. The MAG using
MN MAG
SK − decrypts and checks N 2 +1 to elude the replay attack.
C. Password Change phase
Step 
Security analysis of the improved protocol
This section proves that the proposed protocol is provably secure. Starting from the formal model and assumption, the proof will proceed as follows:
A. Security model
The provable security model is used to prove the robustness of proposed scheme. 
where q s are total Send queries; q e are total Execute queries; q h are total hash queries to h. 
Game G 2 . This game is very similar to G 1 , but G 2 is terminated if we receive some collisions of the partial transcripts N 1 and N 2 , and the hash h. Conferring the birthday paradox, the maximum probability of partial collision on h is , where l is the length of h value and random numbers. Therefore:
Game G 3 . In this game, we once again change the simulation of queries to the SendClient oracle for the selected session in game G 2 . This time, we change the way we compute SK so that it becomes independent of password and ephemeral keys. When Send (Π 
On the other hand,
Combining Eqs. (2)- (6), we get following results:
Security attributes and comparisons

A. Stolen-verifier attack
In proposed protocol no tables containing PW MN for verification are stored by AAA server. The server authenticates MN by its own secret parameter sv. Therefore, proposed scheme is free from stolen verifier attack.
B. Man-in-middle attack
Consider the attacker who intercepted the messages between MN and MNG, and replaced part or the whole message with some fake information. However, cannot generate so called legal fabricated message because does not know PW MN and sv. Therefore, our scheme withstands impersonation and modification attacks.
C. Mutual authentication
In proposed scheme both MAG and MN authenticates each other without possibility of impersonation. Therefore, mutual authentication property is satisfied in proposed scheme.
D. Freely chosen password
Proposed scheme provides MN the facility to freely select and change his password anytime anywhere without intervention of server.
E. Known-key security
The peripheral keys N 1 and N 2 are freshly chosen values during each session. The session keys are independent to each other. Thus, the compromise of one or more previous session keys does not affect the next session keys.
F. User anonymity and untraceability
Any adversary cannot extract the real identity of MN, because ID MN is protected by sv. Furthermore, AID MN is dynamic and varies session to session based on random N 1 . So proposed scheme provides MN's anonymity and untraceability.
G. Resistance of smartcard loss/theft problem
We assume that is able to steal a user's smartcard. Once the attacker gets a smartcard, he can derive the confidential data {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 3 , h()} stored in the smartcard by physical attack. In proposed scheme, PW MN is hidden in h(sv||ID MN ) and c g . can get hold the information stored in the smartcard but he cannot check the correctness of the guessed password because he is lacking the knowledge of sv and ID MN .
H. Performance and security comparisons
To evaluate the performance of the improved scheme, it is compared with Chuang et al. CLC13. In Table 2 , the comparison is provided based on the security, while their efficiency is compared in terms of computation in Table 3 . Three parameters of time complexity are adopted in this analysis and they are defined as follows: _ T h : Hash function's running time, _ T S : Symmetric encryption/ decryption's running time.
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Experiment results in [12] show that the execution times of a hash function operation and a symmetric encryption/decryption operation, are 0.0023 ms and 0,0046 ms, respectively. From Table 2 and Table 3 , it can be concluded that the proposed scheme provides better security and efficiency than the Chuang et al.'s scheme.
Conclusion
In this paper, we briefly reviewed Chuang et al.'s security handover for PMIPv6 and demonstrated that it does not satisfy the expected security attributes for a secure handover in PMIPv6. We then showed that it is vulnerable to the critical attacks, such as stolen smartcard and off-line dictionary attack, replay attack and impersonation attack. In addition, we pointed out that the identity of MNs and the session key between MN and MAG can be disclosed by an insider attacker in Chuang et al.'s mechanism; resultantly, anonymity and confidentiality between MNs and MAG will be completely broken. Therefore, in spite of the claims of Chuang et al., we showed that their scheme is not suitable to achieve a secure handover for PMIPv6. Moreover, an improved authentication scheme was proposed to overcome the security problems of Chuang et al.'s scheme. The security analysis showed that the improved scheme could satisfy required security attributes. Table 2 Security comparison
